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Too Big To Fail: Limiting Public Risk in Hydropower 
Licensing 
Joshua H. Viers and Daniel M. Nover 
The financial crisis of 2008 resulted in widespread economic distress 
and near collapse of the global financial sector.  While the causes of the 
crisis were complex, the emerging corrective outcomes provide insight as to 
how large, interconnected institutions with direct oversight of high-valued 
resources should be regulated.  In the case of the financial sector, improved 
regulatory oversight has resulted in a series of changes for banks that are 
deemed too big to fail.  In other words, banks—whose financial assets and 
obligations are so valuable that their potential demise would have 
catastrophic and cascading impacts to other connected institutions and 
constituents in “downstream” transactions—are now required to limit their 
exposure to internal and external system shocks.  In response to this crisis, 
methods to assess and reduce relative risk and exposure, as well as the 
development of preparedness and response strategies in the event of future 
adverse conditions, were generated via new fiscal and monetary policies.  
These policies have centered on four pragmatic reforms: stress testing, 
performance monitoring, triggers for remediation, and escrow accounts to 
maintain liquidity.1   
 
  Joshua H. Viers, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor in Environmental 
Engineering at the University of California, Merced, where he directs the 
Center for Information Technology Research in the Interest of Society 
(CITRIS) and Banatao Institute, and also serves as the co-Director of the 
University of California’s Water Security and Sustainability Research 
Initiative (UC Water).  Prior to joining UC Merced, he was research faculty at 
UC Davis in Environmental Science and Policy and served as the Executive 
Associate Director of the Center for Watershed Sciences.  He received his 
B.S. (1994) and Ph.D. (2003) from UC Davis. 
 Daniel M. Nover is an Assistant Research Scientist and water resources 
engineer for CITRIS and UC Water at UC Merced.  He received his B.S. from 
McGill University (2000), M.S. from Michigan Technical University (2004), 
and Ph.D. from UC Davis (2012), after which he was a Research Fellow with 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science (2012-2015).   
1.  John Maxfield, The Dodd-Frank Act Explained, THE MOTLEY FOOL  (Feb. 2, 
2017, 2:39 PM), https://perma.cc/ZV9S-AQL7. (Ultimately these reforms, and 
others, were included in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act.) 
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Large-scale water management systems in general, and California’s 
water management system in particular, provide a good analogue to the 
financial system.  In California, our water system meets the needs of more 
than 39 million people, supports the irrigated production of over a third of 
the nation’s vegetables and two-thirds of the nation’s fruits and nuts, and 
powers the fifth largest economy in the world.2  However, it is also highly 
decentralized and routinely subject to system shocks, such as prolonged 
drought.  In essence, our water management system is too big to fail.  We 
argue here that similar policy reforms are necessary to reduce future system 
shocks in water management systems caused by global climate warming and 
subsequent alteration to regional hydroclimatic regimes, and thereby reduce 
exposure of downstream beneficiaries to unnecessary risk.  While such 
reforms in the financial sector were reactionary, the case for proactive 
climate change adaptation in water management—and in hydropower 
relicensing specifically—has been made previously because the stakes are 
too high and the risks too great.3 
These observations are especially important today as a recent spate of 
bills in the U.S. Congress have attempted to roll back regulation of water 
management activities, such as the most recent H.R. 23 Gaining 
Responsibility on Water Act of 2017.4  Other bills have focused on 
deregulation of hydropower production in the United States.5  These bills 
cite, among many things, the desire to expedite future dam and hydropower 
development.6  In particular, the “improvements” sought by the latter bill are 
to lessen protection for the environment and limit scientific scrutiny by 
utilities regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission seeking to 
 
2.  See State of Cal. Dep’t of Fin., E-1 POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR CITIES, 
COUNTIES AND THE STATE WITH ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE (2016-2017), 
https://perma.cc/AGP5-3SQU; see also Cal. Dep’t of Food and Agric., 
CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION STATISTICS 2016 CROP YEAR REPORT 
(2016), https://perma.cc/44G7-YPL9 (California’s share of global gross 
domestic product (GDP) varies from year to year, but is routinely in the top 
ten compared to other countries.). 
3.  Joshua A. Viers, Hydropower Relicensing and Climate Change, 47 J. OF AM. 
WATER RESOURCES ASS’N. 655, 655–661 (2011). 
4.  Richard Frank, California Members of Congress Seek to Eviscerate State 
Water & Environmental Law, LEGAL PLANET (July 10, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/9J43-NDER.  
5.  Hydropower Improvement Act, S.1236, 114th Cong. (2015); Energy 
Policy Modernization Act, S. 2012, 114th Cong. (2015). 
6.  Senator Lisa Murkowski & Jay Faison, Stop Wasting America’s 
Hydropower Potential, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2016/01/14/opinion/stop-wasting-americas-hydropower-potential.html. 
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extend hydropower operation licenses under the Federal Power Act (as 
amended).7  We argue that hydropower—particularly in California, which 
depends on a large and complex network of hydropower facilities—would 
benefit from more robust regulation given anticipated shifts to the 
hydroclimatic regime due to global climate change.   
 
Climate Change & Hydropower Relicensing 
In the United States, the federal agency responsible for regulating the 
generation, transmission and sale of energy is the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), which regulates the transportation of oil in interstate 
commerce, the transmission of natural gas, and licenses nonfederal 
hydropower projects.  The stated mission of FERC is to “assist consumers in 
obtaining reliable, efficient and sustainable energy services at a reasonable 
cost through appropriate regulatory and market means.”8  Although largely 
unknown to most Americans, FERC has enormous sway in how hydropower 
generation is conducted, and ultimately who, if anyone, is responsible for its 
potential negative effects. 
Hydropower is a renewable source of energy and represents 
approximately twenty percent of the world’s energy supply.9  As an energy 
source, it is viewed as both vulnerable to global climate warming10 and an 
asset to reduce climate-altering emissions.11  Hydropower is particularly 
vulnerable to hydrologic alteration driven by global climate warming12 as its 
 
7.  Ben Adler, Is Obama Blocking Smart Hydropower Development?, GRIST (Jan. 
27, 2016), https://perma.cc/8K37-94F6; see also Senator Lisa Murkowski & Jay 
Faison, supra note 6 (Pacific Gas & Electric Vice President Randal Livingston 
provided evidence to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 
Livingston cited specific grievances that are remedied by limiting non-
licensee data collection and limiting interpretation of project nexus 
determination, both of which would serve to limit scientific scrutiny of 
proposed actions).   
8. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, https://perma.cc/8X4B-
WD48.    
9. Cutler Cleveland, ENCYCLOPEDIA ENERGY, 325–332 (1st ed. 2004). 
10. Bernhard Lehner et al., The Impact of Global Change on the Hydropower 
Potential of Europe a Model-Based Analysis, 33 ENERGY POLICY 839, 839—855 
(2005). 
11. Lea Kosnik, The Potential of Water Power in the Fight Against Global 
Warming in the U.S., 36 ENERGY POLICY 3252, 3252–3265 (2008). 
12. Zbigniew W. Kundzewicz and Luis José Mata, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
WORKING GROUP II: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 211–272 (Alfred 
Becker et al. eds., 2007). 
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generation depends directly on the magnitude and timing of available “fuel,” 
or stream discharge.  Hydropower is also increasingly the focus of regulatory 
agencies trying to more effectively manage multiple ecosystem service 
benefits.13  These issues are particularly topical in California, as the state 
grapples with a water supply that is increasingly stretched between 
numerous demands, including energy production, domestic, industrial and 
agricultural water uses, flood control, recreation, environmental 
conservation, and hydropower generation.14 
Recently, climate change research has focused on the increasing 
frequency and documentation of extreme weather events, such as droughts, 
floods, and hurricanes.  The vulnerability of California’s water system to 
these types of climate shocks has been on stark display over the past several 
years.  Following the prolonged 2012-2016 drought, which created the very 
real possibility that hydropower facilities would not be able to meet their 
electricity generation goals, California experienced what is, by most 
accounts, a record precipitation year.15  As a result, catastrophic flooding 
occurred across the state, with enormous damage to property and 
infrastructure, the most visible of which was the spillway of the Oroville 
Dam. 
Several environmental advocacy groups had previously identified 
design flaws in the Oroville Dam, the largest reservoir in California’s State 
Water Project, which centered around the potential for downstream risks to 
public safety.16  These concerns were largely dismissed by the California 
Department of Water Resources (DWR), the operator of Oroville Dam, and by 
FERC during the original licensing.17  Interestingly, the Oroville Dam was 
slated for relicensing in 2007, but the process had been delayed for 
approximately ten years before an extreme atmospheric river event in 2017 
 
13. Birgitta Malm Renöfält, Effects of Hydropower Generation and 
Opportunities for Environmental Flow Management in Swedish Riverine Ecosystems, 55 
FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 49, 49–67 (2009). 
14. Ellen Hanak et al., Managing California’s Water from Conflict to 
Reconciliation, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, 2011, at 102. 
15. Press Release, Northern Sierra Precipitation Sets Water Year 
Record, Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. (Apr. 12, 2017). 
16. Motion to Intervene of Friends of the River Sierra Club South Yuba 
Citizens League at 14-16, Project No. 2100-52 (Submitted before the end of 
the filing period to provide the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission staff 
and the licensee with an early presentation of the licensing issue.). 
17. Sam Stanton & Ryan Sabalow, State Water Officials Were Warned of 
Oroville Dam Weakness a Dozen Years Ago, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 13, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/Y3J7-RAJ4. 
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brought significant damage to the spillway structure.18  Joined by others, 
these same stakeholders are currently challenging the FERC relicensing due 
to the unaddressed public safety concerns in addition to downstream 
environmental impacts.19  As a result, Oroville Dam faces further relicensing 
delays in consideration of the safety of the facility and other factors20 and 
presumably increased scrutiny in how this facility will handle future 
uncertainty in extreme climatic events. 
Such scrutiny is important because FERC presently does not require 
consideration of climate altered or non-stationary hydrology in its issuance 
of hydropower operating licenses, which are issued for a period of thirty to 
fifty years.  The current re-licensing process administered by FERC appears 
at odds with emerging best practices for climate change adaptation given 
recent observations of extreme climatic events and the concurrent move 
toward integrated water resources management and planning, which 
promotes the coordinated development and management of water resources 
to maximize social benefit while sustaining ecosystems.21  In California, 
climate change adaptation strategies in integrated water resources 
management have included improved conjunctive use of groundwater 
through the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 201422 and 
development of multi-benefit setback levees to mitigate extreme flood 
events.23  In general, however, the best practices advocated by DWR through 
its Climate Action Plan has not included specific recommendation for 
changes to hydropower operations to plan and mitigate for extreme events, 
such as flood and drought.24 
 
 
18. Eric Holthaus, The Dam Truth: Climate Change Means More Lake 
Orovilles, Grist (Feb. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/2QPY-9CAG. 
19. Ryan Sabalow & Dale Kasler, Groups Demand Transparency on Oroville 
Dam Spillway Repairs, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 19, 2017), https:// 
perma.cc/EPZ8-7GC6. 
20. Motion to Intervene of Friends of the River Sierra Club South Yuba 
Citizens League, supra note 18, at 14–16. 
21. Jordi Gallego-Ayala, Trends in Integrated Water Resources Management 
Research: A Literature Review, 15 WATER POLICY 628, 628–647 (2013). 
22. Sustainable Groundwater Management Act; A.B. 1739, 2014 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); S.B. 1319, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); S.B. 1168, 
2014 Leg., Reg. Sees. (Cal. 2014). 
23. Ellen Hanak & Jay Lund, Adapting California’s Water Management to 
Climate Change, CLIMATIC CHANGE, 2011, at 102. 
24. See PERSPECTIVES AND GUIDANCE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ANALYSIS, Cal. 
Dep’t of Water Res., 2015, https://perma.cc/5PBP-HHDY.  (DWR recommends 
stress testing with extreme scenarios, e.g., outside of observed record). 
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Climate Change Adaptation in Water Resources Management 
The water resources management sector has historically dealt with 
climate variability and uncertainty in strategic ways.  This adaptation is most 
evident often during periods of floods or droughts when our water 
management infrastructure is used to ameliorate imbalances in supply and 
demand across space and time, where storing water for several years and 
delivering it over 1000 km away is routine.  For California, the construction 
of numerous dams and aqueducts under the federal Central Valley Project 
and the State Water Project during the middle of the 20th century was an 
elaborate engineering approach to capturing and storing water from places 
of supply and delivering it to places of demand.  This infrastructure is a form 
of longer-term adaptation to stationary climate signals,25 which often rely on 
the assumption that observations from the historical record are sufficiently 
robust to capture the range and variability of any future event.  However, 
non-stationary hydroclimatic trends challenge the underlying basis for static 
approaches to water resource management.26  Recent non-stationary 
behavior in hydroclimatic signals—such as increased frequency and severity 
of droughts and decreasing trends in snowpack —have prompted the use of 
adaptive management, which uses a shorter-term set of measures that 
center on flexible operations, forecasting and innovative uses of existing 
delivery and supply infrastructure to meet unexpected demands and 
ameliorate hydroclimatic extremes.27  Used correctly, adaptive management 
provides a framework for flexible decision-making in rapidly changing 
environments as results from management actions become available or as 
new information comes to light.28  The concept of adaptive management has 
been discussed extensively for management of natural resources and water 
management generally, and for climate change adaptation in particular.29 
 
25. Eugene Z. Stakhiv, Pragmatic Approaches for Water Management Under 
Climate Change Uncertainty, 47 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN WATER RESOURCES 
ASSOCIATION 1183, 1186 (2011). 
26. P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 
SCIENCE 573–574, 573 (2008) 
27. National Research Council, Adaptive Management for Water Resources 
Project Planning, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS, (2004). 
28. Kai N. Lee, Appraising Adaptive Management, in BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: 
BALANCING INTERESTS THROUGH ADAPTIVE COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT 1-26 
(Louis E. Buck & Charles C. Geisler eds., 2001). 
29. Id.; see also Claudia Pahl-Wostl, Transitions Towards Adaptive 
Management of Water Facing Climate and Global Change, 21 WATER RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT 49, 49–62 (2007); see also Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting 
Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning 
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As applied in the financial sector, this framework includes periodic 
“stress tests” and exercises to provide new information and response 
strategies.30  Such stress tests quantitatively determine the reliability of 
management structures, robustness of contingency actions, and overall 
resilience of the study system.31  In the case of hydropower relicensing under 
FERC, the formal development of study plans, which often include elements 
of hydrodynamic modeling, is the only equivalent to stress testing afforded 
by licensees to managing agencies and stakeholders.32   
 
Remedies to Existing Relicensing 
Climate change adaptation in the water resources sector is a formal or 
informal response to changing environmental conditions and can be 
infrastructure-based, e.g., reinforcing levees to buffer against floods of 
higher magnitude and frequency, or more programmatic, e.g.,  incentivizing 
flood protection measures via tax policy.33  Formal incorporation of adaptive 
management in hydropower relicensing has been rare despite its apparent 
suitability for water resource management in an era of hydroclimatic 
change.34  This is not to say that relicensing does not provide opportunity for 
improvement, as alterations to infrastructure and operations are routinely 
 
Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 1–77 (2009); Robin K. Craig, “Stationarity is Dead” 
- Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law. 34 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 9–73 (2010).  
30. John Crabb, PRIMER: Dodd-Frank and Stress Testing, INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW, Sept. 22, 2017; see also Maxfield, supra note 1.  
31. Id. 
32. Here we draw a distinction between “stress testing” of FERC 
licensed facilities for response management to non-stationary 
hydroclimates, and the recent stress testing by the California Department of 
Water Resources to evaluate structural integrity of dams statewide following 
the Oroville Dam Spillway incident, as well as the stress testing by the State 
Water Resources Control Board to evaluate conservation mandates imposed 
on water agencies to ensure sufficient water to serve customers for several 
years, based on average demand during the just-concluded 2012-2015 
drought period.  The stress testing advocated within the California Climate 
Action Plan is more relevant.  PERSPECTIVES AND GUIDANCE FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 3, 42, and 55.  
33. Mac Taylor, Managing Floods in California, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST 
REPORT (2017), https://perma.cc/NLN4-QPQG.  
34. Michael Kiparsky, Anita Milman & Sebastian Vicuña, Climate and 
Water: Knowledge of Impacts to Action on Adaption, 37 ANNUAL REVIEW OF 
ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES 163, 163–194 (2012).  
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considered and implemented in relicensing under FERC’s request or 
through settlement agreements.35  These adjustments can include new 
investments in or rehabilitation of major infrastructure, as well as 
modifications to operations and maintenance that are not limited to 
incorporation of new regulations or altered operating conditions.  However, 
these adjustments are often made only at the outset of each license 
issuance or renewal.36  This policy approach provides some measure of 
surety to licensees from which to project future production and revenue for 
the life of the license.37  The static nature and narrow view of this policy 
prescription prevents programmatic responses to conditions and events 
outside of previous experiences or in response to potential alternative 
conditions.   
At least two assumptions underlie the counter arguments to formal 
inclusion climate change impact analysis as a standalone study plan.  One, 
even if hydroclimatic change effects were a clear and pressing issue, it would 
be up to the licensee to effectively deal with its outcome.  Two, if potential 
hydroclimatic changes were directly affecting valued resources, they would 
be mitigated for in the existing plant operations or in future relicensing 
efforts.  With respect to the former assumption, it has been argued that 
leaving adaptation up to licensees risks failure without recourse, which is 
unacceptable if the water management system is indeed too big to fail.38  With 
respect to the second assumption, evidence that mitigation is taking place is 
mixed, although there are instances where shortening license duration, 
aggregation of licenses, or more aggressive requests to reopen a license has 
been seen.   
 
A. Shortening Licenses 
One potential remedy to limit negative effects of non-stationarity on 
integrated water resources systems is to shorten the duration of hydropower 
licenses, as locking in management conditions for three to five decades is 
risky given mid-century hydroclimatic projections.39  Longer, fixed license 
 
35. E.g., Colin Apse, John Banks, Laura R. Day, Jefferey J. Opperman & 
Joshua Royte, The Penobscot River, Maine, USA: A Basin-Scale Approach to Balancing 
Power Generation and Ecosystem Restoration, 16 ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY (2011).   
36. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore all such 
instances, this review is provocative in this sense.  See Michael A. Swiger, 
Ann P. Southwick & Stephanie L. Mairs, Paying for the Change: Can the FERC 
Force Dam Decommissioning at Relicensing, 17 ENERGY L.J. 163 (1996). 
37. Viers, supra note 3, at 655–661.  
38. Id.  
39. Kiparsky, supra note 34, 163–194.   
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duration was intended to provide utilities with financial assurances via 
operational longevity.40  Unfortunately, most early licenses were issued prior 
to the establishment of key environmental laws, such as the federal 
Endangered Species Act or Clean Water Act.  Accordingly, the incorporation 
of such laws into modern relicensing efforts has increased the length of time 
for relicensure and thereby increased consulting costs, time, and resources 
expended by resource agencies, stakeholders, and FERC staff.  FERC has 
revised its procedures in an effort to streamline processes, including its 
recommended Integrated Licensing Process (ILP), which incorporates a priori 
views of the various stakeholders along a strict timeline.41  Given the current 
constraints of the ILP, there is little incentive for the licensee to embrace 
change from the status quo.42  For example, it would be prudent to limit 
licenses to a time envelope within which climate change is unlikely to 
negatively impact hydropower generations, say thirty years.43  If the current 
licensing period (thirty to fifty years) is deemed approriate to provide 
utilities the necessary surety for investment, some intervening reassessment 
should be made to determine if changes in hydroclimatic conditions have 
occurred that necessitate some reevaluation of operational conditions.44 
 
B. Aggregation of Licenses 
A second remedy to minimize the cumulative effect of hydropower 
operations on downstream beneficial uses and provide a means for action 
oriented climate change adaptation through coordinated reoperation is to 
aggregate or at least coordinate licenses within a single basin.45  To a limited 
degree this already happens, but it is at the discretion of the licensees.46  
Given the complexity and cost of relicensing, there is a desire by licensees 
and stakeholders to stagger licenses to limit an overload of commitment 
 
40. Lea-Rachel D. Kosnik, Sources of Bureaucratic Delay: A Case Study of 
FERC Dam Relicensing, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG.  258, 262–263. (2006). 
41. Apse, supra note 35 and Viers, supra note 3, at 655–661.   
 42    Kaveh Madani, Hydropower licensing and climate change: Insights from 
cooperative game theory. 34 ADVANCES IN WATER RESOURCES 174, 179–180 (Feb. 
2011). 
43. Id.  
44. See Office of Energy Products Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, HYDROPOWER PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF HYDROPOWER BASICS 
(2017); see also Sarah E. Null, David E. Rheinheimer & Joshua H. Viers, 
Climate-Adaptive Water Year Typing for Instream Flow Requirements in California’s 
Sierra Nevada, 142 J.  WATER RESOURCES PLAN. AND MGMT. 11 (Nov. 2016). 
45. Kiparsky, supra note 34, at 163–194. 
46. Kosnik, supra note 40 at 258–288.  
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and engagement. On the other hand, as most licenses are now issued with 
corresponding settlement agreements, there are increasing incentives to 
bundle various commitments into a single, comprehensive approach.47  The 
exclusion of federal facilities from such approaches remains problematic. 
 
C. Adaptive Licenses  
While nearly all newly issued licenses include settlement agreements, 
a few are now including formal steering committees, such as the Ecological 
Resource Committees or ERCs that have been implemented in the 
Mokelumne and Feather River watersheds.48  While the resulting 
recommendations to the licensee can provide an effective, non-litigious 
means to consider new information and adaptively alter operations, the 
ERCs are operated by consensus, which may be difficult to achieve given the 
many conflicting interests.  Further, the licensee may have incentives to be 
uncooperative given potential additional expenses or revenue loss resulting 
from recommended actions.49  That being said, some ERC members, such as 
federal land-owning agencies, have sufficient authority to enforce 
recommendations to the extent that they fall within the jurisdiction of that 
agency.   
 
Needed Relicensing Reforms  
While the existing relicensing process itself provides a basic 
mechanism for adaptation, the existing framework has yielded few 
substantive examples.  During the relicensing period, numerous studies are 
conducted to assess the potential environmental impacts of operations.  
Formally incorporating climate change into the relicensing process is one 
way to address the points raised here and by others regarding climate 
change impacts on operations.50  For example, climate change impacts 
studies could integrate assessments of updated knowledge about the 
hydroclimatic record and updated hydroclimatic projections into operations 
impact studies.  Similar studies have been proposed to FERC, but rejected.51  
Therefore, formal incorporation of hydroclimatic change into FERC 
relicensing efforts will likely require reform of the process.  Similar to 
 
47. Apse, supra note 35.  
48. Id.  
49. Id. at 258–288.  
50. D.E. Rheinheimer, S.M. Yarnell & J.H. Viers, Hydropower Costs of 
Environmental Flows and Climate Warming in California’s Upper Yuba River Watershed, 
29 RIVER RES. AND APPLICATIONS 1291, 1291–1305 (2013). 
51. Viers, supra note 3, at 655–661. 
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banking institutions that are now considered too big to fail by regulatory 
authorities, reforms were made to the manner in which their financial 
worthiness was assessed.52  Some of these institutional reforms have 
resonance with hydropower relicensing, including stress testing, 
performance monitoring, triggers for remediation, and escrow accounts.   
 
A. Stress Testing  
In the financial sector, large institutions with multiple and complex 
obligations and contingencies are now required to undergo “stress tests” to 
determine if system shocks, either from outside events or internal decision-
making, will compromise the ability of the institution to meet its 
“downstream” obligations.53  These tests are conducted to quantitatively 
determine the overall reliability of management structures, robustness of 
contingency actions given perturbation, and overall resilience of the 
institution.54  Outcomes from these tests identify means by which to reduce 
relative risk and exposure to system shocks, and aid in the development of 
preparedness and response strategies in the event of future adverse 
conditions.55   
Hydropower and water management institutions, with similarly 
complex obligations to downstream beneficial uses, should have 
comparable safety measures.  In the case of hydropower relicensing under 
FERC, however, the development of study plans is the only equivalent to 
stress testing afforded by licensees to management agencies and 
stakeholders.  And while these study plans do include quantitative 
approaches, including very detailed stream-reach flow studies and 
operations modeling, they have yet to formally incorporate hydroclimatic 
change.56  Reforming this oversight through formal stress testing within a 
FERC relicensing purview could take many forms including: formal 
environmental impact studies, more academic sensitivity analyses, or 
 
52. Maxfield, supra note 1.  
53. Downstream is used here in both the figurative sense (i.e., 
cascading financial failures enabled by overleverage, such as the collapse of 
Bear Stearns) and literal sense as defined by the financial industry (i.e., 
consumers of financial products).  See Anita K. Krug, Downstream Securities 
Regulation, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1589 (2014).  
54. Maxfield, supra note 1.  
55. Id.  
56. Peter B. Moyle, Joseph D. Kiernan & John G. Williams, Improving 
Environmental Flow Methods Used in California Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
Relicensing, HYDROPOWER REFORM COALITION (2011).  
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development of climate-informed worst-case scenario planning into existing 
study plans.   
 
B. Performance Monitoring 
Relicensing is a process that includes thorough stakeholder 
engagement, consultation with resource specialists, advice from well-staffed 
legal teams, etc., and one that is ostensibly intended to ensure that licensed 
operating conditions do not cause extraordinary harm to valued 
environmental or cultural resources.57  Despite the extraordinary effort and 
money directed toward relicensing, the requirements for post-licensure 
performance monitoring are comparatively negligible.  Stated differently, 
requirements for post-licensure environmental monitoring in hydropower 
licenses are commonplace, but are not used in an adaptive manner.58  Study 
requirements are often short term and like other license conditions, the 
monitoring requirements must be supported by a clear nexus to 
operations.59  Further, licenses typically do not specify any consequences 
based on the outcome of studies or monitoring, though the formation of 
ERCs could alleviate this limitation. 
 
C. Triggers for Remediation 
Performance monitoring is useful to the extent it exposes management 
strategies that fail to meet the objectives of integrated water resources 
systems.  In the event that sub-optimal strategies are identified, remedial 
actions must be taken.  Milestones or triggers need to be established so that 
during monitoring of system performance, managers can recommend 
remedial actions if objectives are not being met.  In the case of California’s 
water resources, the spillway and emergency spillway failures at Oroville 
Dam in 2017 are indicative of a triggering event requiring remediation, 
because by explicit intent FERC is responsible for implementing regulations, 
supervising inspections, and approving action plans intended to safeguard 
the public from catastrophic emergencies “defined in the regulations as an 
impending or actual sudden release of water at the project caused by natural 
disaster, accident, or failure of project works.”60  It is unclear, however, if 
substantive changes will be made to reservoir and hydropower operations 
following this event despite the desire of stakeholders to improve 
safeguards for public safety and limit degradation to the environment.   
 
57. Viers, supra note 50.  
58. Id.  
59. Kosnik, supra note 40.  
60. Viers, supra note 50.  
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D. Escrow Accounts to Maintain Liquidity 
One of the chief lessons of the financial crisis is that systems that are 
too big to fail often imply private profit but, in the event of system failure, 
require public bailouts.  In other words, the profit is private but the risk is 
public.  This paradox can be seen in the hydropower context as the public 
largely depends on a group of large, complex, quasi-private entities to 
manage a necessary public good (i.e., water).  A major remedial action 
following the financial sector meltdown is that financial institutions found 
to be overleveraged or insufficiently liquid via stress tests or performance 
monitoring are now required to maintain higher levels of capital to protect 
against system failure, and to limit cascading impacts on downstream 
dependents.61  In the context of hydropower, an analogous recommendation 
would require hydropower operators to maintain escrow accounts with 
preset liquidity so that in the event of an emergency, the burden of 
remediation would be borne by the licensee rather than the public.  This 
would not only enable rapid response in the event of an emergency, but 
could also finance adaptive management approaches to identifying, 
understanding, and remedying changing environmental conditions due to 
extreme hydroclimatic events.  Further, these accounts could eventually be 
used in the event of project decommissioning to offset the large and largely 
publically financed costs of doing so.62 
 
Conclusion 
While in principle water resources management has evolved over time 
to reduce vulnerability and enhance system resiliency given high uncertainty 
of increased demands and diminished supplies, underlying assumptions 
have not.  Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, assumptions of 
hydroclimatic stationarity remain.63  Further, operational rules, such as those 
employed at Oroville Dam for flood control and reservoir releases, remain 
indexed to a previous hydrologic era.  At the end of the day, licensees and 
 
61. Maxfield, supra note 1.  
 62.    Dominique R. Scalia, I’ll Take the Benefits If You Pay the Costs: Weighing 
the Equities of Public and Private Funding Sources for Hydroelectric Dam 
Decommissioning, 2 AM. INDIAN L.J. 2. 
63. Stakhiv, supra note 29; see also R. J. Watts, B. D. Watts, J. J. Opperman 
& K. H. Bowmer, Dam Reoperation in an Era of Climate Change, 62 MARINE & 
FRESHWATER RES. 321, 321–327 (2011); Jamie Pittock & Joerg Hartmann, Taking 
a Second Look: Climate Change, Periodic Re-Licensing and Better Management of Old 
Dams, 62 MARINE & FRESHWATER RES. 312, 312–320 (2011).  
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stakeholders alike will only embrace anticipatory adaptation to the extent 
that scientific tools and underlying data can transcend institutional and 
regulatory barriers.  While all relicensing parties have a need to embrace 
transparency and to seek license measures that are clear and enforceable, it 
is clear that socioeconomic and environmental values are different today 
than they were at the initial issuance of most FERC licenses.  Further, the 
technological leaps being made today are beyond the imagination of anyone 
thirty to fifty years prior.  Therefore, it is safe to assume that our knowledge 
and skill will only improve in the coming decades and that the remedies and 
reforms to relicensing presented here may be moot.  However, until more 
comprehensive approaches such as integrated water resource management 
frameworks are more generally embraced, effective governance will remain 
elusive and institutional conflicts will prevail.64   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64. Casey Brown, The End of Reliability, 136 J. WATER RESOURCES PLAN. AND 
MGMT. 143, 143–45 (2010).  
 
